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Touqir Hussain Published April 4, 2025
IRAN is at its weakest moment externally since the Iran-Iraq war. Israel’s aggression in Lebanon and Gaza has critically wounded Iran’s allies Hezbollah and Hamas, while Yemen’s Houthis are under intense pressure from massive US air strikes. And Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, the linchpin of Iran’s strategy of surrounding Israel with a ‘ring of fire’, has gone. Tehran’s Axis of Resistance is virtually no more.
Israel’s air strike on Iran on Oct 26 last year had damaged its missile production capabilities and knocked out the S-300 air defence systems. Prior to that, Iran’s two drone and missile attacks on Israel had been largely ineffective, exposing the weakness of the former country’s much-vaunted deterrence capabilities.
As Paul Salem wrote for the Middle East Institute recently, “For many years, Israel and Iran maintained an uneasy equilibrium of mutual deterrence and limited hostility”, but that is over. US President Donald Trump is being pressured by Israel to target Iranian nuclear facilities at Tehran’s moment of ‘maximum vulnerability’, or face the prospect of unilateral action.
Trump does not want to act militarily; he’d rather deploy ‘gunpoint diplomacy’. He has re-imposed his policy of maximum pressure aimed at driving Iran’s oil exports to zero, forcing the country to abandon the nuclear option. In an interview with Bret Baier of Fox News, he said: “There’re two ways of stopping them [Iran]: with bombs or with a written piece of paper. And I’d much rather do a deal.” He has since written to Iran’s Supreme Leader proposing direct nuclear talks.
Iran has reportedly increased its stockpiles of 20 per cent and 60pc enriched uranium. This brings it closer to building a bomb should it decide to do so, or use it as a leverage to revive the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Since coming to power, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has been signalling an interest in returning to the JCPOA. Ali Larijani, an adviser to the Supreme Leader, has been more specific. Speaking to the Trump administration, he has said in a media interview, “…we won’t pursue a bomb, and you accept our conditions to reach an agreement”.
The regime faces serious economic challenges because of Trump’s extreme pressure. Relief is doubtful due to the ambiguity surrounding support from China, because of its possible strategic accommodation with Washington, and uncertainty about Russia’s backing in view of the emerging Putin-Trump bonhomie.
Israel sees a window of opportunity here to take out Iran’s nuclear facilities but lacks the capability to do so. It will not find a partner in the US, which may have the capability but not the intent. Israel sees Iran in terms of expansionism. The US interest is much broader. Washington looks upon Iran and its nuclear programme in the context of global geopolitics, its regional interests in the Middle East, and security of the Persian Gulf and its link to global shipping, which is vulnerable to Iranian retaliation to any military strike by the US or Israel that could ignite a wider war. The isolationist Trump does not like war. Besides, a loss in war shatters a strongman’s myth of invincibility.
Trump is thus unlikely to attack Iran or greenlight an Israeli attack. Removal of the Iranian ‘threat’ might make the Arab monarchies feel relatively secure, and thus less amenable to US influence and compulsion to normalise with Israel, and possibly less dependent on American weapons. It might also push Iran into China’s lap. The attack will be another Mossadegh moment — the overthrow of Iran’s prime minister in 1953 — further setting back US- Iran relations for decades to come.
Yet Tehran cannot afford to take heart from the unlikelihood of war. Growing public grievances aggravated by crippling sanctions pose a serious risk. A nuclear deal could help. Iran will not bargain away its nuclear programme, the ultimate guarantor of the regime’ survival, but it could take the gamble of rolling it back. The programme may have reached a dead end anyway as any further movement towards weaponisation heightens the risk of attack. The weakened regime can no longer balance all these risks, including its risky posture in the region, and is treading cautiously.
Trump presents a threat and an opportunity. The regime may have chosen to take the opportunity. All that Iran may have to do is give enough concessions so that he can prove to his base, as in the case of the North American Free Trade Agreement renegotiations during his first term, that he got a better deal from the one he withdrew from. Iran’s ‘threshold capability’ to build a weapon is a sizeable bargain chip. Compulsions and incentives, at least for talks if not a deal, thus exist on both sides.
The writer, a former ambassador, is adjunct professor, Georgetown University, and Visiting Senior Fellow, National University of Singapore.
Published in Dawn, April 4th, 2025
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Shahab Usto // DAWN: April 4, 2025
THE recent in-camera civil-military huddle at Parliament House once again unfolded three conceptual cleavages that have rent apart the polity. One, the establishment continues to seek stability through a ‘hard state’, or a state that prioritises security over other constitutional and democratic imperatives. Two, a major component of the political leadership continues to differ with the mode and object of the counterterrorism strategy, besides questioning the legitimacy and continuity of the military-backed ‘hybrid’ regime. And, finally, the military leadership remains unhappy over the ‘governance gaps’, which it sees as the ‘key reasons’ behind the spike in terrorism.
Thus the old, unresolved questions about the nature and object of the state, the legitimacy of the political system — both the earlier and existing one — and poor governance continue to plague consensus-making on the fight against terrorism. These questions will remain in place unless their answers are sought from the ultimate sovereigns of the republic — the people of Pakistan. Only they have the legal power and moral authority, through their chosen representatives, to determine the nature, role and performance of the state and its institutions. But the people are nowhere in the conversation. In fact, all forms of people-state interface — the legislature, ECP, judiciary, and media — have been numbed to the point of ineffectiveness. Even the democratic façade is being dismantled brick by brick by a myopic state and political elites for ‘security and stability’. But trading democracy for stability has never paid off in the absence of a robust rule of law. Indeed, unbridled authoritarianism has caused inequities, conflicts, misgovernance, and even the collapse of state structures.
No wonder all international wars — 1948, 1965, 1971, 1999, and the decades-long ‘war on terrorism’ — were arguably triggered by military dictators or under the security establishment’s influence. Even the wounds (KP and Balochistan) inflicted on the body politic can be traced to misconceived foreign and internal policies devised by military rulers. Yet, renewed efforts are on to forge a ‘hard state’, raising two questions: before opting for an authoritarian or military option to deal with terrorism, have the proponents of the hard state objectively analysed the state’s failures to end this menace over three decades of ‘kinetic operations’?
Secondly, has democracy ever really had a chance to employ its vast conflict-resolving repertoire — a representative parliament, an independent judiciary, rule-based responsible governments, a free media, and above all, an accommodating sociopolitical environment — to engage, negotiate, recompense, pacify, and integrate discontented and estranged sections of the populace?
Just imagine. If there was a truly elected parliament giving effective representation to Balochistan, in terms of allowing every citizen — and not just powerful tribal chiefs or pro-establishment elements — to freely contest elections and win the popular mandate, would there be a cause for the Baloch insurgency or military operations, which are ripping the federal fabric? Or, had there been a fiercely independent and just judiciary coming to the rescue of citizens abducted by state agencies or harmed by militants, would there be any desperate families and affected people taking to the streets and clogging the cities and thoroughfares? Or, had rulers been genuinely wary of public and institutional accountability, would there be so much inefficiency, recklessness, and corruption in the public sector, leading to pathetic service delivery? Or, if public policies on war and peace were left to freely elected representatives reflecting the collective wisdom of the people, rather than to a closed coterie of generals and politicians, would state and society experience so much bloodletting from terrorism, counterterrorism, wars and insurgencies?
No doubt, societal conflicts and international wars have shaped human history. From the founding of the Akkadian Empire (2350 to 2150 BCE) to the present day, the world has seen a bloody scramble for territories, markets, resources and glory. But wars have also led to the crumbling of great imperial and colonial powers — Austro-Hungarian, German, Russian, Ottoman, British, French, Japanese — leading to the creation of a large number of independent states. Many of these states were multicultural; they needed inclusive and equitable political systems to resolve disputes rooted in identity, faith, land and resources. Thus, federal and multicultural democracies successfully accommodated, and even absorbed, varied and conflicting interests. But those who resorted to authoritarianism and coercion failed miserably.
Pakistan does not match the classical Westphalian model of ‘one nation, one state’ either. It is a melange of various geographical, ethnic, religious and sectarian entities, and needs a truly federalised democracy under an able and wise leadership to establish a stable, peaceful state. It was important for the new state to instil a feeling of commonalty, participation, and ownership in diverse ethno-cultural sections. It could have taken a page from successful federal and multicultural states such as Switzerland, the UK, US, Canada, Indonesia, Malaysia, Australia, New Zealand and others. These states have, in varying degrees, successfully constitutionalised the distribution of powers, authority and resources among the constituent units, both horizontally and vertically. But in Pakistan, multicultural challenges were met with a lethal mix of authoritarianism and a religio- nationalist ideology. Thus, the historical fault lines — religious, sectarian, ethnic and sociocultural — were papered over by a superimposed state that increasingly relied on coercive policies and apparatuses. Resultantly, the country became a battleground for competing groups and interests, with some resorting to employing extremist and militarist means to achieve their goals.
Deplorably, misconceived state policies have pushed the country into an abyss. There is discontent all around. KP is crying for security; Punjab for political justice; Balochistan for rights and representation; and Sindh for resources, particularly land and water. The authoritarian model of (mis)governance has failed. To repair the frayed fabric, Pakistan desperately needs to cultivate soft power — democracy, justice, education, arts, culture, science, technology, rights, liberties, and the environment. The ‘hard state’ was neither conceived nor promised by the founding fathers. Nor has it worked over the decades. The promise was of federal democracy; it’s time to redeem it.
The writer is a lawyer.
shahabusto@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, April 4th, 2025
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WITH Balochistan in tumult, the political class needs to heal the province’s wounds with sagacity and far-sightedness. The need for security must be balanced with efforts to bring all those forces in Balochistan that believe in the constitutional process to the negotiating table and forge a path to peace based on reconciliation and confidence-building with the state.
In this regard, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, while exchanging Eid greetings with the Balochistan chief minister in Lahore on Wednesday, reiterated that developing the province remained amongst his government’s top priorities, and that all efforts would be made to improve people’s lives. In a parallel development, the CM also made Eid visits to various political leaders of the province, including ex-Balochistan CM Abdul Malik Baloch. At the meeting CM Sarfraz Bugti welcomed “constructive proposals … to promote peace and development in the province”.
Mr Sharif and Mr Bugti have adopted the right approach, and though sceptics may say the state has come around to the idea of development and inclusivity a bit late in the day, one should remain optimistic, as the alternative is more violence. Development in the province is essential, and several past administrations have made similar promises to Balochistan. But holistic development can only work when there is organic and credible political activity in the province.
Reaching out to Dr Malik Baloch was the right step, and other Baloch leaders with credibility, such as Akhtar Mengal as well as the BYC, must be included in a wider outreach. In fact, political actors from across Pakistan must take the lead in engaging the democratic forces of Balochistan and earnestly addressing the woes of the province. There must be a commitment to respect the people’s political choices, along with an end to enforced disappearances and rights abuses in the province. Most importantly, both the civilian and the military arms of the state must endorse political outreach efforts to end the insurgency permanently.
Of course, the militant threat in Balochistan cannot be dismissed. Those who engage in terrorism and threaten the security of Pakistan must be dealt with through kinetic measures. But if non-violent political and rights movements are forcefully crushed by the state, the insurgency will be difficult to quell. That is why the state must make a clear distinction between peaceful activists, and violent militants, and refrain from demonising the former. If the people are not allowed to peacefully air their grievances, it will only radicalise such movements, and push them into the arms of the separatists. Moreover, hostile foreign actors will also exploit these internal fault lines to stir up trouble. Therefore, the state can begin anew in Balochistan and push for peace, or continue down the same failed path.
Published in Dawn, April 4th, 2025
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