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TODAY'S DICTIONARY
escalate = increase rapidly = بہت تیزی سے پھیلنا
hiatus = a long pause or halt = ایک لمبا وقفہ
precipitously = done suddenly and without careful consideration = کوئی کام عجلت میں بغیر احتیاط کے کرنا
caveat = a condition to be fulfilled = ایک شرط جس کا پورا کرنا لازم ہو
reprisal = counter offensive = جوابی حملہ
lucrative = promising big financial benefits = زیادہ مالی فائدہ دینے والا
cascading effect = falling like water in a stream from top of a mountain = پانی کی آبشار کی طرح اوپرسے نیچے کی طرف بہنا
Maleeha Lodhi // DAWN: 13 January 2025
WHEN the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan over three years ago, Pakistan’s policymakers assumed this would help to guarantee the stability of the country’s western border. That has long been a strategic compulsion given Pakistan’s troubled relations with India on its eastern flank.
But the assumption about securing the border with Afghanistan under Taliban rule turned out to be a strategic miscalculation. It did not take long for it to become evident that the Taliban takeover enabled the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan to reorganise, revitalise and then escalate cross-border attacks, posing a serious security threat to Pakistan. The Taliban’s unwillingness to take action against the TTP upended Islamabad’s expectation that Kabul would be responsive to Pakistan’s security concerns.
Successive reports by the UN Security Council’s Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team reinforced Pakistan’s assessment by the finding that the “TTP benefited the most of all the foreign extremist groups in Afghanistan from the Taliban takeover”. Its latest report of July 2024 says the “TTP remained the largest terrorist group in Afghanistan, with an estimated strength of 6,000-6,500 fighters”. It “continues to operate at significant scale in Afghanistan and to conduct terrorist operations into Pakistan from there”.
The report also says “the Taliban do not conceive of TTP as a terrorist group: the bonds are close, and the debt owed to TTP significant”. According to the report, the TTP receives support — and oversight — from Afghanistan’s General Directorate of Intelligence aimed at preventing defections to IS-K, the Taliban’s principal foe. TTP’s links to Al Qaeda also continue.
There was a significant surge in cross-border terrorist attacks by TTP last year and rise in casualties of law-enforcement personnel, which heightened the security challenge for Pakistan. In fact, 2024 was the deadliest year with the highest number of casualties in terrorist attacks in almost a decade.
Three-and-a-half years of talks on the TTP between Pakistani officials and Taliban authorities yielded little. Taliban responses ranged from asking for time to ‘manage’ TTP to urging Pakistani officials to talk to the militant group as well as offering assurances of resettling its fighters away from the border and asking for financial help to do this.
With their patience exhausted, Pakistani authorities began to adopt a harder line towards Kabul, also undertaking unannounced kinetic attacks on TTP sanctuaries and individuals in Afghanistan. Public statements by Pakistani leaders became tougher. Taliban leaders were asked to choose between the TTP and Pakistan. Military spokesmen held the Afghan interim government squarely responsible for “arming terrorists and providing a safe haven for them”.
Last week, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif demanded Kabul take action to stop TTP from attacking and killing innocent people, calling that a red line for Pakistan.
This followed an audacious TTP attack on a border post in Makin in late December which left 16 security personnel dead and forced Pakistan to retaliate. Days later, on Dec 24, Pakistani fighter jets carried out air strikesagainst TTP hideouts in Paktika province. The Taliban authorities lodged an angry protest with Islamabad and claimed their forces retaliated by hitting several Pakistani positions along the border including in Waziristan. These armed clashes injected more tensions into an already strained relationship.
This at a time when Pakistan’s special envoy for Afghanistan Muhammed Sadiq was in Kabul holding talks with the Afghan Deputy Prime Minister Maulvi Abdul Kabir and other Taliban officials aimed at de-escalating tensions. Overshadowed by the air strikes, Sadiq’s visit marked an effort to reset ties with Afghanistan after over a year of coercive policy actions pursued by Islamabad.
These actions included, apart from unannounced air strikes (except strikes in April 2024 which were publicly acknowledged by Islamabad), transit trade restrictions and expulsion of illegal Afghan refugees from Pakistan. Kinetic actions are often referred to by Pakistani military officials as intelligence-based operations and aim to degrade TTP’s capabilities.
Coercive actions as a whole were designed to raise the costs for the Taliban of their non-cooperation on the TTP. These measures yielded limited results. Pakistani authorities then decided diplomatic re-engagement with Kabul was necessary to prevent a breakdown in relations, resuming dialogue after a year’s hiatus to explore possibilities for resolution of trade and security disputes. Both sides seemed keen to halt the deterioration in relations with bilateral trade and transit trade having precipitously declined over the past year or so.
In fact, talks between Taliban officials and a hybrid delegation (that included military officers) led by Sadiq explored avenues to enhance economic cooperation. They ranged over key trade issues including renewal of the transit trade agreement and finalisation of a preferential trade deal as well as the one-document regime that Pakistan is implementing as part of its border control policy. These talks, according to official sources, were proceeding in a positive direction and in a “cooperative atmosphere”, with an agreement for high-level visits to resume in January, when the air strikes took place.
Although the armed clashes and exchange of hot words between the two countries have put diplomatic engagement on pause, it is nonetheless expected to resume sooner rather than later. This indicates a tentative shift in Pakistan’s strategy away from a focus only on coercive actions and a one-item agenda with the Taliban involving the TTP. But there is an important caveat to this. Pakistani authorities have also signalled to Kabul that any major attack from Afghan soil will invite a Pakistani reprisal and likely hot pursuit. Casualties will not be tolerated and Pakistan’s hand will be forced to take kinetic action.
This carrot-and-stick policy will likely shape the planned reset of ties with Afghanistan. Islamabad hopes the combined effect of diplomatic engagement and trade inducements as well as pressure on the TTP issue would encourage Taliban authorities to respond to Pakistan’s security concerns.
Pakistan therefore seems intent on employing both incentives and disincentives in a renewed bid to prevail on the Taliban. It should also consider crafting a regional strategy in collaboration with China and Afghanistan’s other neighbours to mount collective pressure on Kabul to change course on the terrorism issue, which remains a common worry for the entire region.
The writer is a former ambassador to the US, UK and UN.
Published in Dawn, January 13th, 2025
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Saeed Ahmed // DAWN: 13 January 2025
THE importance of institutions for economic development and growth has long been recognised — for example, in the writings of Adam Smith and, more recently, exemplified by Douglass North’s 1993 Nobel Prize.
Governance quality and perceptions of the political, economic, and policy climate are critical in shaping overall conditions for investment and growth. Given the mobility of international capital, strong institutions play a major role in attracting and retaining investment inflows.
Pakistan’s declining growth and investment trends are largely attributable to the continuous decline of its institutions. This is reflected in poor governance assessments in the World Bank’s ‘Worldwide Governance Indicators’. When benchmarked against regional counterparts, Pakistan’s performance is subpar. For instance, in ‘government effectiveness’, India’s percentile rank was 67.9, while Pakistan lagged at 30.6 in 2023. In ‘political stability and absence of violence/terrorism’, Pakistan’s rank was a mere 6.6. Similarly, in ‘regulatory quality’, Pakistan’s score of 19.8 was well below India’s 47.2.
Governance in Pakistan’s public institutions has reached a critical point. The political leadership remains oblivious to the fact that their actions, motivated by political ambitions and vested interests, are eroding key state institutions — parliament, judiciary, and executive. Consequently, Pakistan is trapped in a low-growth, low-investment cycle, facing insurmountable development challenges. To illustrate, the economy grew by just 0.98pc in the first quarter, well below the projected 3pc for this year.
The current self-styled democratic government, often called a ‘hybrid regime’, continues to undermine civilian institutions. Parliament, a key state organ, is in a precarious position.
The speedy passage of the 26th Constitutional Amendment and six subsequent bills — such as expanding the Supreme Court bench from 17 to 34 judges and extending the tenure of military chiefs from three to five years — shows blatant disregard for the institution. These bills were rushed through both houses, quickly assented to by the president, and published in the gazette — all within a few hours. This questionable process reflects a complete disrespect for parliament, where members were apparently instructed to vote ‘yes’ without debate, often unaware of the bills’ content or implications.
Like the judiciary, the executive is also crumbling. Key positions are filled by civil servants loyal to the ruling parties, without regard for seniority or relevant expertise. Moreover, serving military officials have been appointed heads of civil institutions.
Pakistan’s tax authority faces acute organisational problems. The current FBR chairman, from administrative service, was appointed after the prime minister picked him for the lucrative slot, superseding over two dozen senior officers of Customs and Inland Revenue Service. This led to a cascading effect within the organisation, with several junior officials appointed to higher posts, potentially impacting institutional performance.
Since the early 2000s, successive foreign-funded tax reforms and government-appointed commissions aimed at improving the tax-to-GDP ratio have all failed, weakening the FBR’s capacity to collect taxes. Furthermore, the government removed 25 senior tax officials, based on intelligence reports, draining morale among tax officials.
The State Bank of Pakistan’s institutional capacity is similarly being eroded. For two years, it has operated without a deputy governor for critical monetary policy and economic research functions despite the legal requirement to fill such positions within 30 days of a vacancy. Another deputy governor position for banking has been vacant for two months. Amidst a severe economic crisis, the failure to appoint qualified leadership is inexcusable.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif has empowered the security agencies to clear all appointments to public service requiring federal cabinet approval. This effectively allows junior security officials to overrule ministerial and secretarial recommendations, circumventing the authority of the cabinet to approve appointments of seasoned professionals with internationally recognised expertise.
The establishment’s interference in political affairs is an old issue, but it has recently taken active charge of the country’s economic management, formalised by the creation of the Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC) in June 2023. Initially premised on creating a one-stop facility to attract foreign investment from Gulf countries, the SIFC has virtually become a supra-cabinet, with the military leadership now overseeing economic matters.
The army chief’s meetings with businessmen to discuss economic issues, coupled with assurances of $100 billion in foreign investment, illustrate the SIFC’s growing influence. Coordinated by a military officer and granted the status of a division, the SIFC has created a parallel structure within the government.
Investment is not secured through government MoUs or by mantras. It is the private sector that creates opportunities and negotiates with foreign investors. Investment depends on political and economic stability, policy consistency, investment security, and global competitiveness of businesses. Despite the SIFC’s efforts, investment fell to a record low of 13pc of GDP in FY24, below the long-term average of around 15pc. Pakistan attracted just $1.9 billion in FDI, a mere $275 million increase from FY23, and below the $1.936bn in FY22.
The above instances show that the state is being run in a bizarre fashion. As if globally recognised economic principles and governance standards do not apply to Pakistan, the country has created its own set of governance methods where one institution or group bulldozes the mandate of others.
Without strong institutions, no government plans — such as the recent Uraan Pakistan — will fare any better than previous failed initiatives like “Qarz utaro mulk sanwaro”, or the misguided crowdfunding for mega dams. The country cannot progress through political hymns. We need statesmen, not self-serving politicians, to steer the country out of this mess.
The writer is a former senior adviser of the IMF, and holds a PhD in economics from the University of Cambridge.
dr.saeedahmed1@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, January 13th, 2025
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DAWN Editorial // 13 January 2025
WHEN home feels like a sinking ship, people are forced to make ill-fated journeys for a better life. Last month, numerous Pakistanis died in yet another Greek boat tragedy. According to the US State Department’s 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report, the Pakistani authorities fell far short of meeting minimum criteria in several important areas. For a country viewed as a human trafficking hub, the absence of an official database of victims and trafficking rings, coupled with the inability to ensure efficient investigation, expedient prosecution and conviction of traffickers, is not only alarming, it also fuels unbridled exploitation. In this bleak scenario, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s orders to take severe legal action against the human trafficking mafia, including the confiscation of their assets, are encouraging. But as necessary as it is to clamp down on trafficking networks who prey on poverty and desperation, it is equally crucial to reflect on the circumstances that compel citizens to risk their lives.
The vast and multilayered crime of human trafficking requires a wider, pre-emptive and result-driven strategy from the government. Battling complicit officials and powerful interests tops the list of major challenges — an insurmountable reality without unrelenting political commitment. Moreover, as influential perpetrators get away with the imposition of fines instead of incarceration, the on-ground enforcement of the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act 2018 remains insignificant, rendering it ineffective as a deterrent. Eradicating human trafficking is one of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals for 2030. But estimates show that traffickers dupe thousands of Pakistanis every year due to acute poverty, lack of education, unemployment and violence. Hence, the prime minister’s call for technical training is a long shot because urgent financial support is any household’s priority. Besides, eliminating human traffickers begins with a toughened legal system and a security apparatus empowered enough to withstand political pressure. An invisible side of the odious practice is the growing web of digital trafficking — in 2023, reportedly, online syndicates made up to $37bn from targets across East and Southeast Asia. A UN report in October revealed that online gangs use AI as a weapon of deception. Pakistan’s anti-trafficking measures depend on the speed with which its fractured digital space is restored so that digital slavery rackets, and fraudulent charity enterprises, are successfully thwarted. In short, we must fight fire with fire.
Published in Dawn, January 13th, 2025
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