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TODAY'S DICTIONARY:
clandestine = hidden, secretive, چھپے ہوئے، درپردہ
working in tandem: working in collaboration, مل کر کام یا کروائی کرنا
egalitarian: believing that all people are equal, اس خیال پر مبنی کہ تمام انسان برابر ہیں
pluralist: believing that every religion or ideology has the right to exist, مذہبی رواداری
secessionist: who believes in separating a part of a country from that country, علیحدگی پسند
fragile: weak and therefore breakable, نازک
run amok : behave uncontrollably and disruptively، اودھم مچانا
fiasco : failure, ناکامی
staggering: deeply shocking, astonishing, حیران کن اور تشویشناک
disseminate: spread something, especially information widely, خبریں وغیرہ پھیلانا
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Amir Rana //DAWN: 12 January 2025
IT is easy to say that the state must develop comprehensive and distinct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies; however, what does comprehensive mean? This critical aspect is often missed in policy and public discussions. As insurgents in Balochistan have escalated their attacks, marking a significant increase in frequency and intensity over the past several months, it becomes essential to analyse the characteristics of the insurgency.
Another question often raised during policy discussions is how to compare the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). How are they different, and why does the BLA qualify as an insurgent group while the TTP does not?
The operational strategy and capabilities of Baloch insurgent groups have evolved significantly. The BLA, in particular, has transitioned from conducting low-intensity, small-scale attacks several years ago to executing more sophisticated, high-profile operations today. Similarly, the TTP has adopted operational strategies similar to the BLA’s, albeit on a different scale. Both banned groups draw inspiration from the Afghan Taliban’s strategy, which was effectively employed in Afghanistan.
The Taliban did not invent new strategies; they mainly adopted classic guerrilla warfare tactics, maintaining a light footprint and avoiding large-scale conventional battles except in situations with overwhelming local superiority. This approach allowed them to sustain a prolonged conflict against more powerful adversaries. Both the BLA and TTP have incorporated elements of this strategy, adapting it to their local contexts to prolong their campaigns.
Bard E. O’Neill, one of the leading scholars of modern warfare, insurgency, and terrorism, provides valuable insights into these complex subjects. His work helps answer critical questions, such as what constitutes a comprehensive strategy in addressing insurgency and terrorism. Among his many contributions, O’Neill’s book Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare stands out as particularly important for understanding these issues in local and global contexts.
O’Neill emphasises that the primary distinction between insurgency and terrorism lies in the political goals and public sympathy that violent actors seek to cultivate. Insurgencies are often defined by their broader political objectives and the level of public support they command. In contrast, terrorist organisations typically lack widespread appeal in their political messaging and resort to terrorist tactics to generate fear and attention.
Insurgency and terrorism can be distinguished based on their goals, methods, and scope of operations. Insurgents aim to overthrow existing governments, achieve autonomy, or enact significant political change. For example, the TTP has attempted to enhance its insurgent credentials by reducing attacks on civilians and focusing on broader political aims.
On the other hand, terrorist operations tend to be more decentralised and clandestine, focusing primarily on high-profile attacks to instil fear and undermine the authority of the state. O’Neill acknowledges that there is often significant overlap between insurgency and terrorism. Insurgent groups may employ terrorist tactics as part of a broader strategy, while some terrorist groups may evolve into insurgencies if they gain sufficient popular support or territorial control.
The key distinction lies in the scope of ambitions and the nature of operations. Insurgencies are typically long-term movements involving large-scale organisations, with military and political wings working in tandem. They tend to operate within a specific region or country, aiming to challenge the state’s authority and legitimacy directly. In contrast, terrorist groups usually conduct isolated attacks designed to draw attention to their cause, disrupt societal order, and demoralise opponents.
In this context, the TTP is an insurgency in the making. O’Neill categorises insurgency into seven forms, the worst being the anarchist type, which seeks to destroy the current order without replacing it. Such insurgencies tend to proceed slowly and have limited capacity for dialogue. In contrast, secessionist insurgencies aim to create a new independent state. Traditionalist insurgencies seek to restore a previous social, political, or religious order.
Both the BLA and the TTP overlap these categories. Other forms of insurgency include egalitarian, pluralist, reformist, and preservationist, none of which characterise the BLA or the TTP.
O’Neill outlines a typical three-phase approach used by insurgent movements. The first phase is the Latent and Incipient Phase, during which insurgents build support, recruit members, and establish networks. The BLA has completed this phase, while the TTP is struggling to regain the confidence of people in tribal districts and religious schools in Pakistan. To overcome this weakness, the TTP is mainly recruiting people from Afghanistan and Pakistani refugees in Afghanistan who migrated during military operations in North Waziristan.
The second phase is the Guerrilla Warfare Phase, characterised by small-scale hit-and-run attacks aimed at weakening government forces. The final phase involves insurgents engaging in more conventional military actions to confront the government.
However, insurgent groups with secessionist tendencies require a political face, which the TTP lacks, and the BLA is still seeking. O’Neill also emphasises the importance of Counterinsurgency (COIN) principles, which provide key insights into comprehensive counterinsurgency strategies. The first principle is that the state must restore its image and be perceived as legitimate by the population. Population support and public perception of the state are critical components of a successful counterinsurgency strategy.
The second component is accurate and timely intelligence to disrupt insurgent networks, which is only possible with the population’s support. Securing the population and preventing insurgents from gaining support is crucial. This means the state must end policies based on discrimination.
In Balochistan, resolving the issue of missing persons can limit the BLA’s appeal. Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population is essential to denying insurgents the base of support they need. Addressing socioeconomic grievances is also an integral part of COIN.
Usually, states with fragile political and social structures do not learn from history. They keep repeating similar mistakes and try to fill the gap of intellect through intel.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, January 12th, 2025
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Masood Lohar // DAWN 12 Janury, 2025
THE decision to interlink the waters of the Indus with the Cholistan desert through six canals has sparked a debate on its environmental, social, and demographic consequences. There is widespread concern in Sindh that such a large-scale diversion will trigger significant regional and ecological imbalances throughout the entire system.
The Cholistan desert lies in the arid bed of the ancient Hakra — also called the Saraswati River — which is said to have gone dry about 5,000 years ago. The redirection of Indus waters to this area is aimed at transforming arid lands into fertile plains for increased agricultural production and habitation of humans. But is that all?
The Indus River maintains a dynamic equilibrium all the way from the Himalayas up to the fertile plains of Sindh, and then onwards to the Indus Delta. It is this delicate balance between the glacial melt of the Himalayas and the mangroves within the delta that plays an integral part in weather patterns and monsoons.
Diverting water upstream would be akin to tinkering with this system. The implications for the delta are significant: salinity, loss of mangroves, and shoreline retreat. These changes would impact other entrainment processes in the region, affecting monsoons and worsening climate fluctuation throughout the Indus Valley.
To Sindh, the project spells disaster. Reduced river flows will compound water stress within the already vulnerable districts of Badin, Thatta, Sujawal, and Tando Muhammad Khan. Agriculture — the lifeblood of these districts — will lose its freshwater availability and hence die. In this regard, the availability of drinking water will come under threat, causing communities to migrate to seek better livelihoods.
The water crisis in Sindh is just one domino in a series that could culminate in mass rural-to-urban migration in the province, something which, according to conservative estimates, could displace 10 million people. More importantly, such migration would have its ripple effects for the cities, and at the front line of this incoming wave would be Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad. The demographic effect will be nothing less than seismic.
History provides plenty of grim reminders of such environmental miscalculations. The human-induced drying of the Aral Sea, resulting from Soviet irrigation policies, inflicted a terrible scourge on Central Asia, chiefly in the shape of economic decline and widespread displacement. Pakistan finds itself at a similar precipice today, where such risks of irreversible ecological damage and sociopolitical upheaval are very real.
While Cholistan’s water scarcity needs attention, there are other, viable alternatives to address this that would not cause ecological disaster and sociopolitical tumult. These include modern irrigation techniques and desalination, as well as water-efficient crop cultivation. Dr Hassan Abbas, a renowned water expert, has highlighted the significant aquifer potential beneath the old riverbeds of the Sutlej. According to his research, the floods of 2023 revealed that a substantial amount of water percolated into the ground, replenishing the aquifers under the ancient river channel. He described these reserves as a “hidden treasure’ that holds clean, drinkable water, which could potentially meet the needs of the region’s population, livestock, and even support sustainable agricultural activities.
Instead of investing billions in constructing hundreds of kilometres of canals, wouldn’t it be more worthwhile to capitalise on the ancient aquifers within these riverbeds? These aquifers naturally recharge every year during the monsoon season.
More than just a river, the Indus is the very essence of a civilisation that has sustained itself for thousands of years. If the course of the Indus is altered, it will impact the interlinking ecosystems of the river.
Should this issue be mishandled, it could possibly culminate in an environmental disaster, washing away centuries-old cultural landscapes and leading millions into despair. The stakes for Pakistan, thus, are very high. Strangely, there is an old Sindhi prediction of Samoi Faqirs (14th century) which says: “Haak wehando Hakro, bhajandi bandh Aror, Samein wendi sookhri beh machhi aien lorah” (The Hakra River will flow again in all its former glory. The barrage at Aror (ancient Rohri or Sukkur) will be destroyed, unleashing such devastation that the King of Sindh will come to view lotus roots, waterlily roots, and fish as rare and precious gifts.)
The writer is an expert on climate change and sustainable development and founder of Clifton Urban Forest.
mlohar@gmail.com
X: @masoodlohar
Published in Dawn, January 12th, 2025
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DAWN Editorial : 12 January 2025
REMITTANCES sent home by migrant Pakistani workers have been a saving grace for the country’s faltering economy for the last two decades.
With export revenues growing at a painfully slow pace — and often stagnating for years in between — and foreign capital and investment inflows drying, successive governments have relied on remittances to push import-based consumption to boost growth. Thus, even a tiny increase in cash sent home by overseas Pakistanis can always be a moment for celebration.
The ongoing fiscal year has proved to be exceptional for remittances, with inflows soaring by a third to a record level of $17.8bn in the first half of the year to December from $13.4bn a year ago. This lends hope that the country will be able to meet the targeted inflows of $35bn in remittances, far surpassing export earnings, this year. No wonder the prime minister has used this occasion to “congratulate’ the nation and boast of his government’s success in stabilising the economy while underlining the commitment of overseas Pakistanis to their country’s development.
The market players attribute the surge in remittances through formal banking channels to numerous factors: clampdown on illegal currency trade and smuggling to Afghanistan, stricter controls on exchange companies, exchange rate stability, and increased labour migration, especially young IT professionals, from the country in recent years. It is believed that remittances have a potential to grow to $60bn a year if illegal currency trade is stemmed and customs controls strengthened against under-invoicing of imports by major traders from China, Dubai and elsewhere.
The increase in remittances is indeed a positive development for the economy as these have been driving the current account surplus for the last several months, contributing significantly to exchange rate stability and improvement in the State Bank’s forex reserves in the absence of foreign direct investment, as well as any meaningful bilateral and multilateral inflows.
But it is not a wise policy to rely on them for external account stability. Remittances have their downsides as well. Studies have shown that higher remittances boost consumption and imports, lead to decline in domestic manufacturing and exports, and make economies of recipient nations more vulnerable to global and regional economic crises. No matter how favourable an impact these have on economic growth, remittances cannot be a substitute for exports and foreign private investment, which increase domestic productivity and generate jobs. Moreover, the quantum of remittances a country receives can never be predicted.
Remittances represent hard-earned money by migrant Pakistanis that must be channeled into productive use for the country’s social and economic development instead of squandering on imported luxuries. At the same time, the government needs to devise a strategy to increase industrial and agricultural productivity to boost exports and reduce reliance on uncertain remittances.
Published in Dawn, January 12th, 2025
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DAWN Editorial: 12 January 2025
KARACHI, Pakistan’s economic juggernaut, is the largest contributor to the nation’s tax revenue. The Federal Board of Revenue’s latest data reveals that Karachi’s Large Tax Office accounted for 30.74 per cent of the total tax collection during 2023-24, generating a staggering Rs2,522 billion. Despite this, the metropolis is a picture of neglect, suffering from chronic infrastructural decay and a lack of basic amenities. The state of Karachi’s roads is a case in point. They resemble war zones, with crater-sized potholes even on major thoroughfares, turning daily commutes into hazardous ventures. Meanwhile, public transport remains grossly inadequate for a city of over 20 million people. Residents are forced to rely on private transport, exacerbating traffic congestion and air pollution. The Green Line BRT, while operational, barely scratches the surface of the city’s mass-transit needs.
The energy crisis compounds Karachi’s woes. Gas shortages and persistent electricity loadshedding disrupt daily life, affecting households and industries alike. It’s ironic that the city that drives Pakistan’s economy is left grappling with such crippling power outages. Water scarcity is yet another pressing issue. The majority of Karachi’s residents are deprived of access to clean and sufficient water, relying on private water tankers at exorbitant rates. This basic human necessity has turned into a lucrative black market, further burdening citizens. Despite Karachi’s unparalleled contribution to the national exchequer, it continues to languish without adequate investment in its infrastructure and services. This neglect is not just unfair but counterproductive, as a deteriorating Karachi threatens to undermine the very economy it bolsters. The federal and provincial governments must urgently prioritise Karachi’s development. A city that gives so much deserves better roads, reliable utilities, and efficient public services. Investing in Karachi is not just about fairness; it is essential for Pakistan’s future growth and prosperity. Anything less would be a betrayal of its citizens and economic self-sabotage.
Published in Dawn, January 12th, 2025
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TODAY'S DICTIONARY:
clandestine = hidden, secretive, چھپے ہوئے، درپردہ
working in tandem: working in collaboration, مل کر کام یا کروائی کرنا
egalitarian: believing that all people are equal, اس خیال پر مبنی کہ تمام انسان برابر ہیں
pluralist: believing that every religion or ideology has the right to exist, مذہبی رواداری
secessionist: who believes in separating a part of a country from that country, علیحدگی پسند
fragile: weak and therefore breakable, نازک
run amok : behave uncontrollably and disruptively، اودھم مچانا
fiasco : failure, ناکامی
staggering: deeply shocking, astonishing, حیران کن اور تشویشناک
disseminate: spread something, especially information widely, خبریں وغیرہ پھیلانا
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AFP // Published in DAWN: 12 January, 2025
PARIS: The fall of Russian ally Bashar Al Assad in Syria has disrupted the Kremlin’s strategy not only for the Mediterranean but also for Africa, pushing it to focus on Libya as a potential foothold, experts say.
Russia runs a military port and an air base on the Syrian coast, designed to facilitate its operations in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa, especially the Sahel, Sudan, and the Central African Republic.
However, this model is in jeopardy with the abrupt departure of the Syrian ruler.
Although Syria’s new leader, Ahmed Al Sharaa, has called Russia an “important country”, saying “we do not want Russia to leave Syria in the way that some wish”, the reshuffling of cards in Syria is pushing Russia to seek a strategic retreat towards Libya.
In Libya, Russian supporters already support Khalifa Haftar, a field marshal controlling the east of the country, against the Tripoli-based “government of national unity” (GNU), which has UN recognition and is supported by Turkiye.
“The goal is notably to preserve the ongoing Russian missions in Africa,” said Jalel Harchaoui at the RUSI think tank in the UK.
“It’s a self-preservation reflex” for Russia which is anxious “to mitigate the deterioration of its position in Syria”, he said.
In May, Swiss investigative consortium “All Eyes On Wagner” identified Russian activities at around 10 Libyan sites, including the port of Tobruk, where military equipment was delivered in February and April of last year.
There were around 800 Russian troops present in February and 1,800 in May.
On Dec 18 the Wall Street Journal, citing Libyan and American officials, said there had been a transfer of Russian radars and defence systems from Syria to Libya, including S-300 and S-400 anti-aircraft batteries.
‘Notable volume’
Since Assad’s fall on Dec 8, “a notable volume of Russian military resources has been shipped to Libya from Belarus and Russia”, said Harchaoui, adding there had been troop transfers as well.
Ukrainian intelligence claimed on Jan 3 that Moscow planned “to use cargo ships to transport military equipment and weapons” to Libya.
`Disrupt western interests’
According to Badi, “Assad offered Moscow a foothold against Nato’s eastern flank and a stage to test military capabilities”.
Haftar, he said, presents a similar opportunity, “a means to disrupt western interests, exploit Libya’s fractured politics, and extend Moscow’s influence into Africa”.
The Tripoli government and Italy, Libya’s former colonial master, have expressed concern over Russian movements, closely observed by the European Union and Nato.
Several sources say the United States has tried to persuade Haftar to deny the Russians a permanent installation at the port of Tobruk that they have coveted since 2023.
It seems already clear the Kremlin will struggle to find the same level of ease in Libya that it had during Assad’s reign.
“Syria was convenient,” said Ulf Laessing, the Bamako-based head of the Sahel programme at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation.
“It was this black box with no Western diplomats, no journalists. They could basically do what they wanted,” he said.
Published in Dawn, January 12th, 2025
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