(Very important article on Balochistan's insurgency)
Muhammad Amir Rana
AN unprecedented wave of province-wide violence in Balochistan, launched by the banned Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), has raised significant concerns about the level of unrest in the province and the state’s response. The situation escalated further when passengers were forcibly removed from trucks and buses and shot after their identities were checked in Musakhel district. This incident sparked outrage in Punjab, as the victims were targeted due to their ethnic identity, being from Punjab.
In response, a few social media users from Punjab initiated a campaign against Quetta-based restaurants spread across Punjab, run mainly by Pakhtuns. These individuals also called for the expulsion of Baloch students from universities in Punjab. This reaction played directly into the insurgents’ hands. In conflicts, the identities of the real perpetrators and victims often become blurred, exacerbating the situation and widening the scope of the conflict.
The Musakhel incident has once again sparked debate about why Baloch insurgents specifically target labourers and travellers carrying computerised national identity cards from Punjab. The existing literature on the subject fails to provide a convincing and updated explanation of the insurgents’ motivations, typically focusing on the historical grievances of the Baloch against the federation, ethnic differences, and a sense of political disenfranchisement. To gain a more comprehensive understanding, it’s crucial to consult informed individuals on the ground and consider observations that offer a broader perspective on how insurgents and counterinsurgents view the issue.
A common perception is that Baloch insurgents target Punjabi labourers and travellers because they believe the Punjabi establishment is exploiting their resources. While this may be one factor shaping their narrative, it is not the whole story. The insurgents also target Baloch labourers and travellers from south Punjab, a region with a sizeable Baloch population and where Baloch nationalists lay claim to several districts. The insurgents argue that they target those whom they believe are serving in security services or are part of any state-led development project, regardless of their ethnic background. In the past, they have similarly targeted Sindhi and Pakhtun labourers under the same suspicion. However, most victims have proven to be ordinary citizens without ties to the security services. For instance, Sindhis working as private labourers or in fruit markets have generally not been targeted, unlike those employed by public contractors.
Targeting civilians is a challenging decision for any insurgent or violent movement, as it can be counterproductive, damaging their image and raising questions about their ideological and political foundations. A similar situation occurred with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) when they began targeting civilians, leading to divisions within their ranks. Internal discussions eventually forced them to alter their strategy of targeting non-combatants. A similar dynamic might occur within the Baloch insurgent ranks, where the BLA is more radical than other factions. The BLA justifies targeting non-combatant Punjabis by arguing that these are ‘retaliatory attacks’ in response to the disappearance and mutilation of Baloch individuals in the province. The BLA believes that targeting Punjabis inflicts the most harm on the military and stirs anger in Punjab against state institutions.
However, since the inception of the current phase of insurgency from 2002 to 2007, insurgents began threatening and killing Punjabi settlers in Quetta and later in other Baloch districts, despite Nawab Akbar Bugti condemning these actions and arguing that targeting innocents cannot be justified. In response to this criticism, insurgents developed the narrative that these settlers, particularly barbers, are the eyes and ears of intelligence agencies.
Beyond these justifications, targeting Punjabis is a well-developed strategy for the insurgent groups. By doing so, they can provoke the security forces into launching large-scale military campaigns, which often lack widespread acceptance among the population and generate more sympathy for the insurgents. Military operations reduce the space for political dialogue, which benefits the insurgents, as they feel more threatened by political initiatives than military action.
The insurgents are well aware of the consequences of attacking innocent Punjabi civilians, knowing it can provoke anger against the Baloch, particularly the youth studying and living in Punjab. However, Baloch insurgents, especially the BLA, believe that their survival depends on complete isolation from the rest of the country, particularly from Punjab. Hard-line Baloch nationalists also support this view, arguing that retaliation against Baloch students in Punjab and Islamabad is beneficial, as it will fuel anti-Punjab sentiments and deepen the divide, increasing hatred against Punjab.
State institutions can counter the insurgents’ designs through a well-crafted strategy rather than reacting impulsively. There is growing support for the idea that one of the most effective counterinsurgency strategies would be to sincerely address the issue of missing persons — unlike past attempts, such as the Justice Javed Iqbal-led Commission, which proved counterproductive and further eroded public trust in the state.
Engaging with figures like Mahrang Baloch could be a strategic move, as she has gained significant influence in the province, outshining nationalist parties, including Maulana Hidayatur Rehman. Rehman, who once championed the rights of the people of Gwadar, has remained silent since his election to the provincial assembly. If state institutions are unwilling to engage her in any political process, they must devise a policy to address the issue that earns the complete trust of the victims’ families. Such an initiative could involve trusted parliamentarians and civil society actors. In either case, it would help to pacify the anger among the broader Baloch community.
The state’s real challenge is to counter the insurgents’ propaganda, which claims that the state aims to eliminate Baloch identity by exploiting its resources and encouraging mass migration from other parts of the country, particularly Punjab. Only the Baloch themselves can help the state devise an effective strategy to combat this narrative — not those sharing power with the establishment and benefiting from the prolonged conflict.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, September 1st, 2024
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Nasir Abbas
AS violence erupted in Balochistan on the 18th anniversary of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti’s killing, about two dozen unarmed civilian bus travellers and lorry drivers, mostly from southern Punjab, were among the 50 killed. Baloch insurgents also targeted infrastructure, such as a railway bridge and a number of security force bases.
Those killed included a woman suicide bomber and one man, who reportedly drove a VBIED (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device or a vehicle bomb) to breach a security force base’s perimeter. They were followed by other attackers who entered and engaged law-enforcement personnel.
There were at least seven coordinated attacks, from Musakhel near the Punjab border, where the murders of unarmed travellers took place, to other areas where different siteswere targeted. In my memory, these were some of the most violent, coordinated attacks targeting state writ in the province.
The province has been on the boil since the killing of Nawab Bugti in a military assault on his mountain hideout near Dera Bugti, where he had moved from his ancestral home anticipating state action. (Suffice it to say that it was the ego of the late General Pervez Musharraf and some horrendous counsel by his belligerent Military Intelligence chief, a relative of his, that led to the escalation and blocked a peaceful resolution).
Since then, the state has relied solely on an iron fist to ‘deal’ with the ‘Balochistan issue’, rather than address the ‘issue of Baloch rights’ against the backdrop of increasing alienation of the local population and escalating violence.
While the lead security player in the province, apart from reissuing past statements, remained largely silent on the Aug 26 violence, it was left to the civilian leading lights of the hybrid set-up to speak and share their understanding of the gravity of the situation.
Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif presided over a security meeting attended by the army chief and all security officials. The official statement highlighting the decisions taken at the meeting informed Pakistanis that the country’s chief executive had decided to “post police and administration officers of the 48th Common … to be followed by the 49th Common.”
Officers from the two batches, or courses, of the Police Service of Pakistan and the Pakistan Administrative Service were offered a number of incentives to serve in the restive province, including two tickets every quarter to visit their families.
Perhaps the prime minister had read the excellent piece by respected former law-enforcement boss, Tariq Khosa, in last Saturday’s Dawn, headlined ‘Quest for justice’, and was inspired by it. (Please do read it if you missed it). But if that is all he found inspiring in that all-encompassing piece, I can only despair.
Despair is what many Pakistanis have to live with, and this must include all of us who try and analyse the situation and comment on it. But there is despair and then there is despair, if you know what I mean. And if you don’t, allow me to explain.
How would you react if the day after some four dozen of your citizens, half of them or more unarmed, have been killed by a hail of bullets, even if they survived the suicide bombing, and your interior minister has this to say: Dehshatgard ek SHO ki mar hein (The terrorists can be sorted out by an SHO). An SHO is a local, low-level police officer.
This statement comes against the backdrop of an escalation by both sides and after years of enforced disappearances and apparent kill-and-dump state policy and insurgent violence. If we add up the total number of police, paramilitary personnel, including FC and Levies, I am sure it´ll run into thousands across the province. And everyone knows that the military back-up is also there. This indicates that far too many of our brave security personnel have perished in the spiral.
Asma Jahangir, the iconic human rights advocate-campaigner, once told her critics, who were targeting her for supporting talks with Baloch separatists while opposing any such dialogue with TTP, that, ‘There is a difference’. The Baloch are struggling for their political and economic rights, while the Taliban want to impose their warped interpretation of faith on the country at gunpoint.
I wish the state could make that distinction. It has ushered poster-boy proxies into public offices and disenfranchised Baloch of legitimate and credible representation — to disastrous results. Perhaps it is time to look for a different approach. In fact, it is the patriotic duty of each and every decision-maker to explore other avenues.
And if such a path is pursued, it should be adhered to with more sincerity than when Dr Malik Baloch, as the chief minister, and retired Lt-General Qadir Baloch, then of the PML-N, established contact with an estranged Baloch leader who was willing to enter dialogue, promised to revert to him with a response to his queries, and were, in all probability, vetoed by the security establishment and never returned to the discussions.
This lack of political engagement will have very definitely strengthened the hands of the hostile external forces invested in fuelling instability in Pakistan and would, in fact, play directly into their agenda. That is neither wise, prudent nor will it deliver any security dividend.
Perhaps, once they are done reiterating their iron hand resolve to deal with it, they might be persuaded to look at the British government’s policy formulation and execution in its dialogue with the IRA, or how Spain ended its years-long war with the Basque separatist group ETA. Both countries and their people benefitted from peace, and nobody accused their governments of being lily-livered.
Specifically, if they agree, there should be a brainstorm among Balochistan experts such as Tariq Khosa, Akhtar Mengal, Dr Malik Baloch, Aslam Bhootani (an old friend of mine; just go and see the development in his constituency in Dureji, in the Hub-Lasbela area), the current DGI Lt-General Nadeem Anjum and Dr Mahrang Baloch, who continues to support a peaceful struggle for rights. Add Rana Sanaullah, the PML-N leader, because he knows what it is like to be on the receiving end. And see if a way forward can be found.
The writer is a former editor of Dawn.
abbas.nasir@hotmail.com
Published in Dawn, September 1st, 2024
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Aizaz Ahmed Chaudhary
AT a time when tourism has emerged as a major sector of the global economy, many nations have invested heavily in the industry to contribute to their GDP and also create employment. For Pakistan, too, tourism has the potential to not only bring socioeconomic dividends, but also improve the country’s image. In fact, there are very few countries in the world that can match Pakistan’s combined potential for mountain, religious, heritage, and coastal tourism.
Of the many facets distinguishing Pakistan are its mighty mountains, that have attracted adventure tourists from around the world. Home to the meeting point of the Himalayas, the Karakoram, and the Hindu Kush, the northern areas of Pakistan are an authentic destination for mountain lovers. Of the 14 peaks above 8,000 metres, five are in Pakistan: K-2 (8,611m), Nanga Parbat (8,126m), Broad Peak (8,047m), Gasherbrum-I (8,068m), and Gasherbrum-II (8,035m). According to the Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation, Pakistan is home to 108 peaks above 7,000 metres and an equal number above 6,000 metres. This spectacular landscape is complemented by extensive glacier systems, gorgeous ridges, fabled lakes, picturesque passes, and high-altitude meadows.
The territories of Pakistan have also been the bastion of major religions. Buddhist holy places in the Gandhara region — Mardan, Taxila, Swat, and Takht-i-Bahi — attract tourists from Sri Lanka, Thailand, Japan etc. Eighty per cent of the Sikh religion’s holy sites are situated in Pakistan, notably Nankana Sahib, Punja Sahib, and Kartarpur Sahib. Each year, thousands of Sikh yatrees visit these gurdwaras. Likewise, several temples in the country are revered by Hindus, including Hinglaj Mata in Balochistan, Katas Raj in Chakwal, and Hanuman mandir in Karachi. The Sufi culture of Pakistan also attracts spiritual pilgrims, particularly to the shrines of Data Ganj Baksh, Baba Farid Ganj Shakar, and Lal Shahbaz Qalandar.
Pakistan is the proud inheritor of great civilisations.
Pakistan is also the proud inheritor of great civilisations, including Mehrgarh, and Indus Valley sites at Mohenjodaro and Harappa. Prof Michael Jansen, who studied and wrote about Mohenjodaro, was convinced that this site alone can change Pakistan’s image from a terrorism-afflicted country to a bastion of proud heritage.
Pakistan’s coastline also offers vast opportunities for tourism because of its sandy beaches, boating basins, beach huts and restaurants.
Yet, despite this evident potential, Pakistanis wonder why the country is not able to benefit from this rich national resource. In the Travel and Tourism Development Index 2024 of the World Economic Forum, Pakistan ranks 101st out of 119 countries. (The US is at first place, while China is at nine, India 39 and Sri Lanka 76). Several reasons can be attributed to Pakistan’s low standing in the tourism index.
Firstly, there appears to be no comprehensive national tourism policy framework. There are media reports that the PTDC has developed a five-year plan for 2024-2029 to promote international and domestic tourism, but it is not clear if this has been approved. In any policy framework, the government’s role should be confined to being a legislator of policies, and facilitator, regulator, and provider of services allied to tourism, while the private sector should be encouraged to create and manage tourist places. The prevailing provincial governance structures for tourism need to be revamped with enhanced coordination with the federal government.
Secondly, accurate statistics are not available, because of which planning is either not possible or is flawed. Thirdly, ownership of the local people for tourist sites is important. Only functional local governments can engender community participation in preserving and maintaining this resource treasure, which has suffered from years of neglect by federal and provincial governments. Fourthly, a tourist expects to receive visa facilitation, reliable air connections and safe road access to tourist destinations, decent transport, boarding and lodging, entertainment facilities, internet connectivity, and a safe security environment. Fifthly, nothing puts off a tourist more than the garbage around tourist sites. There should be dedicated departments in local governments to ensure cleanliness. Last but not least, there should be institutions for technical training of local tourist guides.
Of late, one hears of the intent of the government to encourage tourism as a revenue-generating industry. The private sector is also taking initiatives to promote tourism. Conferences are being held all across Pakistan to evolve concrete recommendations on how best to promote the tourism industry of Pakistan. Amidst the prevailing economic crunch, we need every hand on deck to help improve the economic life of the country.
The writer is a former foreign secretary, and chairman Sanober Institute Islamabad.
Published in Dawn, September 1st, 2024
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