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Dr Niaz Murtaza Published May 31, 2022
A KEY sign of political maturity and consolidation is the smooth and legitimate transfer of power among political opponents regularly. It results in political legitimacy and hence stability which then leads to improved governance and progress.
The US has a proud history of over 200 years of such transfers. Regionally, India and Sri Lanka have almost always had such transfers over 75 years. Yet, in some states this never happens, eg Sudan and Myanmar. Pakistan is like these states in rarely having smooth and legitimate transfer of power between two fairly elected parties in 75 years. This is a result both of the dubious manner in which chief executives came to power and were deposed. Four dictators won power in the country via force and lost it unnaturally through death or political pressure. None of the first eight PMs from Liaquat Ali Khan to Nurul Amin during 1947-71 in united Pakistan were elected by assemblies; they were appointed by heads of state. While Liaquat died in office, the rest left due to palace coups.
The 15 regular PMs after 1971 were all elected by assemblies. Bhutto was the first, but only after the failure to transfer power to Mujib led to separation. He was deposed via a coup. Eight other PMs were elected via assembly majorities won through dubious polls in 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002 and 2018; none completed a five-year term. Thus, only six PMs elected via polls in 1988, 2008 and 2013 and the vote of no-confidence in 2022 were fairly elected. But three of them were deposed via dubious presidential or judicial dismissals. The two partial-term PMs from 2008 and 2013 (Raja Pervez and Shahid Khaqan) completed the remainder of the tenure while the fate of the incumbent PM lies in balance. Ten out of our 15 national assemblies emerged from dubious polls while two (1947 and 1972) were extracted from assemblies elected for a larger state before partition. Thus, there has been only one smooth and legitimate transfer of power between two fairly elected parties in 75 years — in 2013.
The bulk of the blame for this sorry situation lies with Pindi for delaying or rigging polls. Out of our 15 national elections or referenda, it has allegedly partially or fully rigged 13 polls, but politicians only one (1977) and that too partially. Only the 2013 polls undertaken fully by civilians were largely free of organised national-level rigging (as reflected by the EU election report). The regime emerging from the only polls rigged by civilians (1977) lasted a few weeks while those winning via establishment-rigged polls lasted for years. But politicians did play key secondary roles in helping the establishment impede smooth transfer of power, eg PPP and PML-N in 1970s and 1990s.
PPP and PML-N learned their lesson during the Musharraf era.
Yet, both learnt their lessons during long years of exile under Musharraf. They displayed much greater maturity in ensuring the smooth and fair transfer of power at least federally if not provincially during 2008-2018 through electoral reforms that involved the consensus appointment of ECP and neutral interim caretaker members. Political tolerance and pluralism and progress on social laws were also higher than in any other eras. Major progress was achieved in rolling back terrorism inherited from Musharraf and in keeping balanced external ties. Economic progress and daily governance was poor yet better than in the hybrid era that followed. In my view, this was overall our best era/decade ever given the progress on the all-crucial and fundamental political sphere.
But this political evolution was rudely ended by those who have impeded smooth power transfers repeatedly since the 1950s, assisted by the new political kid on the block, the PTI. Leaving other parties behind, PTI has impeded a smooth transfer of power four times since 2014. This included its 2014 dharna coup attempt based on false charges of rigging in 2013 polls even though neutral observers had found them to be fair. It then colluded with the establishment to win unfairly in 2018 as shown in the 2018 EU election report. Thirdly, it attempted to illegally defeat the legitimate April 2022 vote of no-confidence. Finally, based on unproven charges of a US conspiracy, it is now aiming to topple the government through dharnas. Thus, its timeline since 2014 consists solely of ruling through dubious polls but still trying to topple fairly elected regimes through questionable means. However, the PTI succeeded only once in these four attempts (in 2018) when it was seen to have the establishment’s full support.
Oddly, then, the two biggest obstacles today to smooth power transfers are both middle-class-led entities while landed/commercial elite-led parties support such transfers. Until both change their politics, the prospects of fair transfers of power and hence political legitimacy, stability and progress remain dim.
The writer is a political economist with a PhD from the University of California, Berkeley.
murtazaniaz@yahoo.com
Twitter: @NiazMurtaza2
Published in Dawn, May 31st, 2022
AN indefinite extension of the ceasefire between the government and the banned TTP has once again refocused attention on the status of negotiations between the state and the terrorists.
After years of battling the banned TTP, the state had reopened channels of communication with the TTP, facilitated by the Afghan Taliban. However, if we review the reported demands of the militants, it is easy to understand why a UNSC report has termed prospects of peace between the TTP and the state of Pakistan “bleak” [مایوس کن].
Read: Truce with TTP — will it be different this time around?
Simply put, if the demands were to be met, it would amount to a surrender of the state’s authority over parts of the erstwhile tribal belt where the militants are active.
Among the TTP’s demands are withdrawal of troops from the former Fata area, reversal of the merger of the tribal areas with KP as well as the enforcement of their version of Sharia through the Nizam-i-Adl regulation in Malakand. In fact, some high-ranking militants have reportedly already been released as a gesture of peace.
However, militant groups should not be allowed to dictate to the state where security forces can and cannot go. Moreover, the merger of Fata and KP in 2018 came about as part of a constitutional process, and cannot be undone to accommodate the TTP’s whims. As for the enforcement of Sharia in the region, a similar experiment was tried in 2009, and fell through very soon, with the military having to move in to quell a rebellion instigated by the terrorists.
Considering this chequered history, prospects of a durable peace with the militants are bleak, unless the TTP promises to renounce [اعلانیہ طور پر ترک کردینا] violence and join the mainstream and respect constitutional norms.
The state is confronted with a dilemma as with the fall of the US-backed regime in Afghanistan last year, the TTP now has friends and protectors in the shape of the Taliban rulers of Kabul. As the UN report points out, there are up to 4,000 TTP fighters holed up[پناہ لئے ہوئے] in provinces bordering Pakistan, while another estimate states that this year alone, the TTP has carried out over 40 attacks in the country, resulting in nearly 80 deaths.
Read: Kabul mediating between Pakistan govt, TTP, says Muttaqi
The problem with negotiating with extremist groups is that they will seldom stick to their word, as history shows, and will return to violence on the slightest pretext[بہانہ یا جواز]. Moreover, even if the militant leadership commits to peace, there is no guarantee that others within the organisation will also honour their pledges [وعدے]. Again, we have seen this happen in the past as splinter groups have branched out to continue to fight.
We must also ask if the state is willing to forgive a group that has the blood of thousands of citizens on its hands. Confronted with these inconvenient realities, the state needs to handle the negotiations with care, and ensure that any peace deal respects the Constitution and the democratic process.
Published in Dawn, May 31st, 2022
Editorial Published May 31, 2022
IT is a bold step; one that seems intended to force a much-needed breakthrough on an issue that has remained a persistent blot on Pakistan’s civil rights record. The Islamabad High Court has ordered the issuance of notices to every chief executive to have presided over government — from the era of retired Gen Pervez Musharraf to the incumbent, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. They have been asked to either satisfactorily explain their “tacit approval” of the state’s “undeclared policy” of disappearing citizens, or face the charge of high treason for knowingly allowing the subversion of civil rights laid out in the Constitution. IHC Chief Justice Athar Minallah has also castigated the National Assembly for not doing enough to fulfil their constitutional obligations, as well as the media for not being persistent in highlighting the issue proactively.
The IHC chief justice is no doubt well aware which organ of the state is actually responsible for the policy in question. His decision to also hold the country’s rulers directly responsible seems to be a considered move to apply pressure on them to refuse in the future any support, tacit or otherwise, to powerful factions who operate from the shadows. It is necessary for the leadership to take a firm stance. A report submitted to the IHC on the performance of the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances earlier this year had made clear that efforts to recover missing persons had yielded only modest results, with the commission sometimes unable to recover even those missing persons whose production orders had been issued by the courts. There can be no justification for disappearing any citizen by force, no matter how severe their crime. Those who favour and justify this policy claim it is sometimes the only way to check militancy and terrorism, when, in fact, it represents major failures on their part in pre-empting, investigating and prosecuting these crimes through the existing legal system. These failures only help sustain a vicious cycle of distrust: enforced disappearances cause more pain, more frustration and deeper feelings of alienation in marginalised communities, which in turn gives them greater cause to support activities antagonistic to the state. Balochistan, whose people face the highest incidence of enforced disappearances and extrajudicial killings, remains difficult to govern as the state has failed to win the hearts and minds of its citizens due to its flawed policies. It is time to reset the strategy.
Published in Dawn, May 31st, 2022
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